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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND AMERICAN LAW
Wiu.iAm M. BEANEY*
THE NATURE OF A RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In his dissenting opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut' Mr. Justice Black berated
the majority for discovering and applying a constitutional "right to privacy." His
reading of the Constitution failed to uncover any provision or provisions forbidding
the passage of any law that might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. Therefore,
he would have upheld a Connecticut act prohibiting the use of, or the giving advice
concerning the use of, contraceptive devices. If Justice Black had examined state
constitutions he would have found them similarly devoid of specific references to a
"right to privacy."
In private law, there are statutes and court decisions that protect various aspects of
privacy and human dignity, frequently under property or contract concepts, but until
very recent times these have not been viewed by the public or most legal com-
mentators as spelling out a comprehensive "right to privacy."' The only explicit
recognition of a "right to privacy" has been found in certain torts cases, dating from
the first decade of this century and following the' suggestion of the famous Warren
and Brandeis article 3 The purpose of this paper is to describe some of the varied
legal strands which, taken together, are beginning to form the structure of a modern
right to privacy, the potential significance of which greatly exceeds the sum of
meanings of the various separate legal rights and duties that are today catalogued
under the rubric "right to privacy." 4
Since all of law and all "rights" in law represent authoritative efforts to define
and influence he relationship of one or morie persons or classes of persons to other
individuals, groups, or classes, we must examine privacy as a series of legal claims
*A.B. 1940, Harvard University; LL.B. 1947, Ph.D. 1951, University of Michigan. Professor of
Politics, Princeton University.. Author, TrE RIGHT TO COUNS.L IN AmERIcAN CoURTs (I9"55); co-author
[with Alpheus T. Mason], THE SuPREmE COUar IN A FREE SOCIETY (1959).
1381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965).
a An obvious example is the protection of land ownership, or, more accurately, the possessory interest
in land. Antitrespass statutes and common law rules protect the rightful possessor against those who
might invade his privacy. Assault and battery doctrines have a similar protective effect.
'The Right to Prlwacy, 4 HtAv. L. Rav. 193 (189o):
'This paper is derived in large part from a longer working paper Pivacy and the Law, prepared
for the Special Committee on Science and Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
April 1964. Because this symposium presents detailed studies of many of the topics treated in my
working paper, I have not dealt with these matters here., For this reason, I may seem to ignore my own
view that a "right to privacy" is meaningful only in so far as one can apply it to situations in the everdav
world.
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with respect to desired or unwanted relationships with others, some of which have
received protection in law while many others are pressing for but have not yet
achieved legal recognition.' One can readily discern at least three categories of
claims that inhere in the legal concept of privacy at this time and must be given a
place in any working definition of a right to privacy. Therefore a right to privacy as
a legal concept can be defined as the legally recognized freedom or power of an
individual (group, association, class) to determine the extent to which another
individual (group, class, association, or government) may (a) obtain or make use
of his ideas, writings, name, likeness, or other indicia of identity, or (b) obtain or
reveal information about him or those for whom he is personally responsible, or
(c) intrude physically or in more subtle ways into his life space and his chosen
activities.
The rights and claims arising within these categories might well be characterized
by a term other than "privacy."' If the psychological concept of "personality" were
less developed, one might propose "rights of personality" as a more positive shorthand
way of expressing the congeries of claims now included in "privacy." "Human
dignity" or "dignity of the individual" conveys a similar idea but with fewer negative
associations than "right to privacy."'' "Privacy" has a largely negative meaning to
many Americans, in the same sense that Warrens' and Brandeis's characterization of
it as "the right to be let alone" may misleadingly suggest a sense of aloofness and
withdrawal from everyday life. The concept "right to privacy" represents essentially
an effort to define some reasonable rules for governing the behavior of active people
whose work, play, and interactions are part of a highly complex interdependent
society. The right is an affirmation of the importance of certain aspects of the
individual person and his desired freedom from unreasonable intrusive conduct by
others. The substance of the right as it has emerged over time is most clearly seen
as the result of a series of favorable responses to claims arising out of conflict-
engendering situations in the real world.
,'It should be noted that this statement concentrates on 'rights" in law, that is, as defined or inferred
from a constitutional system that operates within a context of law. It is not meant to imply that there
are no criteria, moral or ethical, that may -be applied to the law of the state. The typical mode of
argument in favor of recognizing or increasing the protection of a claim has been to blend historical,
philosophical, and sociological reasons in justification of a court decision or legislative enactment. We
like to think that most law is "good" law and that the remainder is at least "neutral" in a moral sense.
For a classic exposition, see EDWARD S. CoRWIN, THE "HIoHER LAw" BACKGROUND Op AmaEmECAN CoNrr-
TUtONAL LAw 0955)-
" ' The difficulty is that each person has his own conception of the meaning of the word. The simplest
notion is of being "let alone." But to many intelligent people the word has an excessively simple and
negative quality.
'A "right of personality" is recognized in German law. For an informative discussion, see Krause,
The, Right to Privacy in Germany-Pointers for American Legislation?, 1965 DuKE L.J. 481. It should
be noted that the German courts constructed the right to privacy on the basis of two extremely general
substantive articles in the 1949 West German Constitution: Article i (r), "The dignity of man shall be
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority"; and Article 2(r), "Every-
one shall have the right to the free development of his personality, insofar as he does not infringe the
rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code." Quoted in id. at 489.
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II
SOCIAL VALUES AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
To those who believe with Justice Black in a literal interpretation of the Consti-
tution, and to all men who find repellent the notion that a right can emerge as part
of the living law of society without a single formal act of creation, any discussion of
a right to privacy will seem unreal and unsupportable. Those who prefer a system
of law characterized by Austinian precision will inevitably be dismayed by an attempt
to show that a common theme, and a central concept, may serve to unite disparate
legal rules and principles into a meaningful new legal concept of significant social
importance to a free society.s Yet, even the most strenuous advocate of a right to
privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and
scope of this right. One danger is that of over-definition, by which "right to
privacy" is used as a shorthand reference to an individual's freedom of thought and
expression, freedom of religion, the guarantee of separation of church-and state, and
many other rights.' At the other extreme is the deficiency of under-definition, which
results from defining as a right to privacy only those claims which in the past have
been clearly labeled "right to privacy" by a court or a legislature.'"
If we are to think "things" and not words, as Holmes admonished, we must look
at myriad human relationships, many of which are in the process of radical trans-
formation as the result of new ways of carrying on governmental and private organi-
zational activities. If the jurisprudence of the last century has taught us anything, it
is the necessity of recognizing that law cannot be static, unless a society also is static.
Although we have no certain touchstone for determining which of competing claims
or interests deserve legal recognition at a given time, the one certainty is that a failure
to examine the social situation in which claims are raised, or a mechanical reliance on
existing law as reflecting a wise allocation of values that is still relevant, will heighten
the gap between social ideals and legal realities. And although only a naive idealist
would expect law to attempt to solve all questions and difficulties arising from social
interactions and functions, we should recognize that a decision not to provide a legal
solution means that we have accepted the existing private, nonlegal resolution of the
issue and the triumph in fact of one set of claims over another. This, of course, does
not necessarily mean that the real-life solution is viewed as satisfactory, but may reflect
a conscious or intuitive judgment that the solution through law may have only
3 The point is that the development of the right is not the result of a legal magician's trick but is a
response to deeply felt social needs that emerge, at least originally, in the form of actual conflicts in the
form of lawsuits.
' Justice William 0. Douglas counts the right to travel, religious freedom, and, indeed, all rights
of conscience among the various protected interests included in the right to privacy or the right to be
let alone. See THE RSHT OF THE PEOPLE 87-165 (1958).
"ojustice Black views the right to privacy solely as a ground for common law tort relief, or as a
statutory right in those states where the legislatures have chosen to give protection. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 51o n.i (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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marginal value in the light of the problems raised and that this addition to the
battery of interventions through law may, in itself, seem to have a doubtful or nega-
tive value from the wider perspective of life in a free society. To be specific, the claim
of many Americans for a greater degree of freedom from unsolicited phone calls
from pollsters and salesmen may generate substantial sympathy but fail to find support
in law because of the difficulties of enforcement and the potential restriction of other,
more praiseworthy, forms of uninvited communications, such as solicitations for
charitable causes or by those engaged in scholarly research.
Most thoughtful people recoil from the principle that there should be a legal
remedy for every social wrong, and are content with a selective process that elevates
into a legal right only those claims that survive an assessment of the nature and
extent of the probable moral and physical harm produced by an allegedly wrongful
act. Admittedly, the way in which some claims succeed in gaining the protection of
law while others arouse little response is almost never dearly evident. Many of our
most fundamental rights appear as deceptively simple statements in the Constitution,
where they have fulfilled at most an educative or admonitory function for long
periods until suddenly they become the central focus of a sequence of claims that
lead to interpretative judicial decisions. As the result we soon have an increasingly
detailed, multi-faceted definition of rights and duties that constitutes the meaning
of a guarantee of freedom of speech, for* example, or equal protection of the laws.
"This is the process that is increasingly evident in the evolution of a right to
privacy. While it is difficult to trace the antecedents of each facet of the right with
any precision, one can identify at least the major sources of the right to privacy and,
at the same time, can see more clearly the countervailing claims or interests that must
be taken into account. For the basic process of balancing interest against interest that,
is at the heart of the definition of other rights will be found in the attempts through
law to define a right of privacy."1 It is important to bring countervailing interests
to the surface for discussion because the danger exists with respect to privacy claims,
as with other rights, that its devotees may in zeal destroy other important values
while pursuing their object with simple-minded devotion. While the chances of
this occurring in the twentieth century United States may seem modest, the validity
of privacy concepts can only receive strengthening from a process of testing claims
1 1 he method of balancing interests, which has been the dominant approach used by Supreme Court
Justices, has at times been tempered by the "preferred freedoms" doctrine, which had its origin in Chief
justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Similarly, justice' Black has insisted on an absolutist interpretation of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g.,
Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in TrE GREAT RIGHTS 42 (Cahn ed. x963).
But the basic method of the common law judges and in constitutional jurisprudence has been to balance
the freedom claim against the countervailing interest unless the claim was patently superior. In a real
sense, that is a central element in any effort to justify a specific law, decision, or a system of authoritative
rules: on reason and on balance of arguments, one resolution of issues seems more desirable, fairer than
another, or more consistent with past decisions where similar conflicting interests were evaluated and
the issue resolved by balancing.
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made in its name against others raised by reasonable men. In addition, we shall
attempt in brief terms to examine the role of the various legal institutions in defining
and applying this developing right.
III
SOURCES OF A LEGAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The usual starting point in any discussion of the growth of the legal concept of
privacy, though not necessarily the correct one, is the famous article "The Right to
Privacy," by Charles Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.' 2 Its publication date-i89o--
represents to many modern minds the entrance upon a new, more sophisticated era
in law, paralleling the attainment of industrial maturity and the onset of myriad social
problems. But it is frequently reported without much comment that the article was
occasioned by the prying, gossipy accounts of the social activities of members of
Warren's family in a Boston newspaper that specialized in such revelations. It is
difficult to conceive of a clash of interests from which it would be more difficult to
extract a-right to privacy. For although some of the most important court decisions
reinforcing freedom of the press were yet to be handed down, the idea that a broadly
defined freedom of the press was essential to the maintenance of a viable political
system and an open society was widely held. And although we recognize that there
are vast differences in the quality of newspapers and that "yellow journalism" is
designed primarily to increase the sale of papers, we have been content to allow the
least-principled publishers to enjoy the protection given their better-principled
brethren, if for no other reason than the impossibility, illustrated by the x931 decision
in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 3 of achieving agreement on what is reasonable
and proper in the controversy-filled world of news reporting.
But if Warren and Brandeis were less than prescient in dealing with the counter-
vailing power of the press, they were more convincing in their efforts to show that
some existing English and American torts previously classified by the courts under
property, contract, or implied trust rubrics were most meaningfully described as rights
of privacy. What was truly creative was their insistence that privacy-the right to be
let alone-was an interest that man should be able to assert directly and not derivative-
ly from his efforts to protect other interests. To protect man's "inviolate personality"
against the intrusive behavior so increasingly evident in their time, Warren and
Brandeis thought that the law should provide both a criminal and a private law
remedy.' 4
.12 4 HAitv. L. RE v. 193 (i89o).
is 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
1 Since newspapers will normally not regard an obscure person's activities as newsworthy unless he
engages in a "newsworthy" act, the most frequent abuses of a right to privacy would arise from the
publicizing of private acts of newsworthy people. But, leaving aside the problem of collecting sub-
stantial damages, how much will a suit for breach of one's privacy contribute to the privacy of the
suitor? The dilemma is similar to that of the defamation victim except that the latter has to calculate
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It would be inaccurate to credit the tort concept of the Warren-Brandeis right
to privacy with effecting any significant change in American life, but then, viewed in
isolation, few legal concepts seem all-important. The approximately 35o decisions
handed down between 19o5 and 1965, many of them under New York's statute
prohibiting intrusive conduct "for the purposes of trade,"'" have had the effect of
proscribing some of the more blatant, thoughtless, or intentional invasions of privacy,
especially where a materialistic motive is evident, but we can only speculate as to a
possible wider social effect of the right."0 And because of the unique totality of facts
in many of the cases, it is difficult to state any general rules or principles; but this
seems inherent in this area of law, since each case turns on the "reasonableness" of
defendant's behavior under the circumstances. 17  Whether newspapers and other
media are influenced in some degree by the potentialities of lawsuits cannot be
answered with assurance. The scandal-mongering type of publication, particularly
those devoted to inside revelations about stars in the entertainment world, obviously
base their operations on the "public-figure" status of their targets and the likelihood
that few of their victims will choose to bring suit. A serious reporting medium will
normally concentrate on newsworthy matters and have little reason to invade the
humdrum world of ordinary people. There may appear to be a certain justice in thus
protecting the privacy of the humble and obscure, but the privacy of the more prom-
inent and active members of society may be in much greater danger. Yet, as noted
above, the strong public interest in publicizing the activities of this latter group may
outweigh their claims to privacy' 8
It is, however, increasingly true that certain forms of visual and auditory sur-
veillance, widely administered opinion surveys, intensively conducted behavioral
research, and computerized data-gathering for various purposes may be rapidly de-
stroying the privacy of the obscure "common man" as our society discovers new
reasons for examining and taking account of the thoughts and behavior of masses of
whether the blow to his reputation resulting from a falsehood compels a suit. The harm from an invasion
of privacy is clearly less tangible in its impact. For an extreme conclusion based on considerations of this
variety, see Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, infra, pp. 3i6-4x.
"CN.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAw SS 50-5r.1 In defending the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), denying the existence of a common law right to privacy,
judge O'Brien gave as one of the principal justifications the "commercial spirit of the age." , In his view
there was "little room left for those that would escape from the publicity that is born of its pusl~ing and
aggressive spirit." O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLum. L. REV. 437, 446 (19o2).
"Dean Prosser, in a 196o article, insists that there is not one but four distinct torts discovdrable in
the cases on privacy, each of which seeks to protect a distinctive individual interest. Privacy, 48 CAIi.
L. REv. 383 (ig6o). He has been persuasively answered by Edward J. Bloustein, who reaffirms the
concept of a single tort, protective of a comprehensive right to individual human dignity against certain
types of interference. Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 962 (1964). See also Kalven, supra note 14.
" Edward Shils has hypothesized that the hierarchical nature of British society has resulted in greater
respect for privacy not only in governmental affairs but in society at large. Tim TofitiNTr or SEcnEcY
ch. 2 (1956).
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common people.'9 For a variety of seemingly useful purposes, such as improved
collection of taxes, more accurate determination of consumers' preferences, or the
scientific study of how people think and act, the average man increasingly finds him-
self the object of official and unofficial scrutiny. Against most of these patterns of
intrusive behavior, the tort remedy appears largely ineffective, either because the
avowed justification of the intrusive action seems reasonable, especially when a zealous
government cites increased efficiency or when the difficulty and expense of bringing
suit seem excessive in the light of limited probable damages. 0
Yet, it would be unwise to dismiss the importance of the tort remedy merely
because it has not proved a panacea. It has the advantage of bringing to the surface
examples of intrusive behavior that otherwise would go unnoticed. If exemplary
damages were available against more serious invasionary acts, more suits would be
initiated.2' In giving the individual at least a modest weapon with which to fight,
the tort doctrine also serves an educative purpose, and its use may occasionally lead
the way toward legislative and administrative action that on the whole may prove
more decisive in combating standard types of intrusive behavior.
The more promising means of safeguarding a right to privacy, however, lie in
several areas of public law, although the interrelationships between these areas are
not yet widely recognized. It is proposed to discuss briefly here some of the potenti-
alities of defining and protecting a right to privacy through constitutional interpreta-
tion, legislative enactments, and administrative rules and decisions. A final word is
also added concerning the responsibilities of private groups in protecting individual
privacy and inculcating a concern for its preservation.
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY
A. Derivation of the Constitutional Principle
Whether one welcomes or despises the propensity of Americans to regard the
Constitution as the embodiment of our most cherished values, it is a fact of our
political life that a constitutional right is more dearly prized than one proclaimed
19 See SA MUEL DASH, ROBERT E. KNowLToN & RICHARD F. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS (i959);
VANCE PAxe AD, THE NAxsn SOCIETY (1964); MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964);
Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLUm. L. REV. 1184 (1965); Hearings on
Invasion of Privacy by Government Agencies Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., ist Sess. (1965); Hearings on Invasion
of Privacy Before a Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, 89 th Cong., 1st
Sess. (x965); Hearings on Psychological Testing Procedures and the Rights of Federal Employees
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89 th Cong.,
ist Sess. (1965).
0 The tort remedy against most governmental intrusions is weak or nonexistent.
21 Especially if the trend toward making legal services available to those of modest or low incomes
continues. But the unattractiveness of the contingent fee case will certainly restrict the bringing of suits
until juries, or judges, take a more serious view of breaches of privacy.
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solely. by legislative act, and, as we know, any novel or doubtful piece of legislation
must inevitably run the gauntlet of judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.
We may begin again with Mr. Justice Black, who asked in effect and answered
negatively the question, "Does the Constitution guarantee a right to privacy?"
Although not always fully consistent in his literal application of the Bill of Rights
to the federal government and, through the fourteenth amendment, to state action,
his fundamental belief that the justices exceed their authority when they depart
from the specific text of the written document has respectable support in our consti-
tutional tradition 2 But it is dearly not the only rational way of interpreting and
applying an eighteenth century document to problems and situations that were un-
foreseeable in 1787.2 Apart from the warning of Madison and others that the
enumeration of certain rights would tend to disparage claims to others, an argument
rejected by those supporting a "Bill of Rights," it is hard to see how several of the
specific rights can be given meaningful scope without necessarily safeguarding a right
to privacy. It would be indeed ironic if this were not so in a constitutional system
designed to protect the integrity of the individual in an age that laid stress on the
necessity of recognizing both the rational and irrational elements in man but which,
above all, wanted to protect his dignity and status as an individual. Why should his
freedom to express his thoughts receive protection if his thoughts could be extracted
from him by the government? And why protect him in his home against arbitrary
arrest and official searches if the government may use electronic or other scientific
ways of observing and eavesdropping?
The great contribution of Brandeis in his famous Olmstead dissent" was his
drawing of the distinction between the interest to be protected and particular forms
of invasion of that interest. In his view, the devising and ingenuity of man in
substituting new scientific techniques for the older, heavy-handed secret observation
of the thoughts, words, and acts of others should not be allowed to succeed in out-
flanking the law.
It follows from Brandeis's approach that if one is permitted counsel in his defense,
"One of the early statements is by Mr. justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398
(1798) (concurring opinion). His target, which is also Justice Black's, was the use of "natural
justice" arguments to invalidate legislation that was not prohibited by a specific constitutional pro-
vision.
'
8 When an extraordinary majority is required for formal amendment one usually has the choice
either of "amending" (or adjusting) by interpretation or permitting the Constitution to become in-
creasingly irrelevant to current needs. The effort to combine both the security of stated principles and
the adaptability through changing interpretations, although dismaying to logicians and absolutists, has
been the chief characteristic of our constitutional jurisprudence.
"Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (s928).
"' The essence of Brandeis's position is that provisions protecting individual and group rights should
be interpreted in the light of changing conditions just as provisions granting power are interpreted to
reflect social and economic changes. Justice Black in Griswold asserts that government can do anything
not prohibited by a specific provision. 381 U.S. at 51o. Brandeis would reject that position in favor
of one that envisages both restrictions on, and powers of, government as subject to continued re-
interpretation and changing application.
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the state should not diminish that right by overhearing a defendant's consultation
with his attorney.20  If a right to teach a foreign language,' of parents to have their
children attend private schools,2" or of citizens to travel29 are implicit in the concept
of freedom or inferable from specific provisions, it is a defensible mental step to con-
clude that the Constitution also protects freedom from unreasonable intrusions into
an individual's or group's life-space and from assaults on their dignity and autonomy.
One of the most interesting of constitutional developments has been the search
for a suitable rationale for protecting the privacy of groups against state efforts to
identify members and through various other stratagems to make hazardous the en-
joyment of a right to associationY° Clearly, there cannot be an unlimited right to
the privacy of associations that seek undesirable social objectives or whose methods of
operation run afoul of reasonably applied conspiracy doctrines. In undertaking this
very ticklish process of separating permissible from prohibitable associational activity
the Supreme Court has taken a long step toward bringing constitutional guarantees
into closer alignment with social realities. For better and for worse, individuals
today frequently find meaningful avenues for asserting personal and social claims
only through associational activity. But some forms of associational activity may
threaten the freedom, including the right to privacy, of other individuals and groups.
A weighing of ends and means is dearly required, and, as in so many other situations
where we seek to use law to shape conduct, resolution of issues in individual cases
is difficult and any rule of law other than a rule of reason is virtually unthinkable.
Whether or not one agrees with the Court's performance in balancing interests to
protect the NAACP while allowing harassment of the Ku Klux Klan and the
Communist Party, U.S.A.," there are sufficient differences between both means and
ends to make plausible a different treatment in law of these associations.
Finally, one can view the heightened concern of the Supreme Court for extending
the equal protection of the laws in various ways to disadvantaged individuals and
"There is little doubt that the Supreme Court would so hold, if a case were presented. A wiretap
would be barred by 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964) (unauthorized publication or use of wire or radio com-
munications), but my reference here is to other forms of electronic eavesdropping. The Supreme Court
has recently agreed to consider several cases involving eavesdropping of a non-wiretapping nature. See
United States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 102-3 (1966) (clandestine
tape recording of defendant's incriminating revelations to undercover agent); United States v. Black,
216 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Mo. r963), aff'd, 353 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927
(1966), memo requested on motion for rehearing, 384 U.S. 983 (1966) (secret microphone apparently used
to monitor defendant's conversations). In the Black case, the federal government revealed in its memo-
randum to the Supreme Court that defendant's premises had been "bugged" but that information gathered
was not used against defendant in a tax evasion trial. See N.Y. Times, July 14, 1966, p. i, col. 8.
-"Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
"
8 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5io (1925).
"9 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. rs6 (1958).
" Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (196o); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (958). Compare these cases with the earlier decision in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
278 U.S. 63 (1928), where a New York law requiring membership lists was upheld in its application
to the Klan.
"1 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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minorities as an important step toward protecting the privacy of ever-larger numbers
of people. In one sense, this is merely the obvious point that equality in fact tends
to mean that rights formerly enjoyed by some will now be the possession of many.
But with respect to privacy values, which have often been viewed as a primary
concern only of higher status individuals, the effort through law to enhance the
privacy and dignity of disadvantaged individuals and groups, whether criminal
suspects, religious or racial minorities, or welfare clients, tends to strengthen the
claims to privacy and dignity of all citizens.
B. The Weighing of Privacy and Conflicting Claims
When the Supreme Court decides a case involving a privacy claim, what claims
and counterclaims does it seek to balance and with what consistency does it justify its
determination for or against the assertion of a right to privacy? Perhaps by ex-
amining several examples of dashing interests we can at least suggest the range of
considerations open to the Court, permitting the opinions to stand as justification for
what the Court did, in fact, decide.
(i) Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak"2 involved a Washington, D.C., bus
rider's resistance to an imposed diet of radio music, news, and advertising on pri-
vately owned but publicly regulated buses. The Public Utilities Commission upheld
this additional service to the commuter as "not inconsistent with public convenience,
comfort, and safety." The court of appeals reversed on the ground that a consti-
tutional right to privacy had been violated. On review the Supreme Court held
that the Public Utilities Commission had acted within its statutory powers and had
not violated any constitutional right of riders under the first or fifth amendments.
In rejecting the privacy claim, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice. Burton,
argued that when a traveler left his home and rode on public transportation, he
had t9 accept reasonable regulations in the interests of the general convenience of
pa.isengers. The Court seemed impressed by the results of a public opinion survey
showing that 934 per cent of riders were not opposed to transit iadio and only tree
per cent were firmly opposed. In short, whether a conventional balance-of-interests
test or a test of reasonableness was applied, the claim to privacy, of a very small
minority had to yield. 3 Only Mr. Justice Douglas saw a violation of a broad right
to privacy, protected by the first, fourth, and fifth amendments, in subjecting a captive
audience to radio programs. He spurned the Court's apparent willingness to let the
preferences of a dominant majority determine the limits of an individual's claim to
privacy.
Whether or not one likes the outcome in Pollak, it raises in an unusually focused
2 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
"Perhaps the emphasis should not be placed on the small number of claimants of the right in this
case but rather on the insubstantiality of the interest. We have become so conditioned to auditory
assaults in stores, restaurants, and other public and semi-public places, that canned music seems as natural
as the air we breathe (to the pollution of which buses have also contributed).
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way the problem confronting courts when the freedom claim has relatively few
proponents, when the possible injury to these claimants seems relatively slight, and
when the constitutional basis is somewhat novel. In a concurring opinion in
Pollak, Mr. Justice Black noted that had bus riders been subjected to public news or
propaganda, their first amendment rights would have been violated, but, unlike
Justice Douglas, he found no violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
(2) Griswold v. Connecticut"4 found the Court receptive to a claim that Con-
necticut law prohibiting the use, or advice concerning the use, of contraceptives
violated the right to privacy of married persons and was therefore unconstitutional.
The disagreement of members of the majority as to the constitutional underpinning
of the claim is less important than the fact that they agreed that a right to privacy had
a constitutional basis and that the justification for the Connecticut act was inadequate.
In this case we have no detailed statistics showing how people in Connecticut or
elsewhere viewed the activities that the state sought to prevent, nor had the state
shown any intention of enforcing the act by invading the privacy of the home. But,
on its face, the state law ran counter to an ever-widening acceptance in American
society of the principle of birth control and, if taken seriously, would threaten the
intimacies of family life. And, as Justice White demonstrated in his concurring
opinion, the state interest in preventing illicit sexual relations could have been served
with equal effectiveness by more narrowly focused statutory provisions3 5
(3) Acceptance of the use by law enforcement officials of electronic devices to
obtain evidence where no trespass has been committed points up the reluctance of
the Court to extend the concept of a right to privacy. In Silverman v. United States,
36
the Court agreed that the use of a spike microphone constituted a trespass and that
the resulting eavesdropping was in violation of the fourth amendment. The earlier
cases had relied on the much criticized Olmstead"1 rationale, that in the absence of a
trespass there is no illegal search when electronic eavesdropping takes placeYs - In
spite of the decision in Lopez v. United States,9 upholding the use of a recording
84 381 U.S. 479 (1965). My preference is for the formulation of Mr. Justice White, concurring, to
the effect that the Connecticut law deprived married couples of part of their "liberty" guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. In effect, liberty, with its manifold meanings, can serve quite as effectively
as "penumbras" as a bar to unreasonably intrusive legislation. Here, at least, the results are the
same.
" This is a principle that has been used erratically by the Court and can be attacked on the ground
that a statute either is, or is not, unconstitutional regardless of alternative measures that might have
slighter effects upon freedom. But if one is to balance interests, it seems reasonable to take into account
discernible alternatives. To permit a legislative body or administrator to select the more oppressive
means of achieving socially desirable goals is to condemn freedom values to a subordinate position in
most conflicts.
86 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
"
T Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
"a See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
59 373 U.S. 427 (1963). It is interesting to note that United States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497 (6th
Cir. x965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 1023 (1966), is now pending in the Supreme Court and involves an
issue strikingly similar to that in Lopez.
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device by an Internal Revenue agent to obtain proof that he had been offered a bribe
by a delinquent taxpayer, it is unlikely that the trespass factor will continue to dis-
tinguish a permissible auditory invasion from a prohibited one. Certainly the "in-
vasion" in Lopez was of the least reprehensible kind-that of an honest official
seeking to protect his own reputation as well as enforcing the law against bribery.
But with the growing public concern over police and private use of electronic devices,
the public interest in security of homes and offices will tend to outweigh the official
need to use these devices for law enforcement and security purposes, when the
courts are confronted with ordinary cases. The spirit that infused the Court's
decision in Boyd v. United States40 and Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead41 is likely to
pervade applications of the fourth amendment in the future, with the stress on pro-
tection of the interest in privacy, rather than on the specific manner in which that
interest is adversely affected.
What we see emerging is a substantial acceptance by the Court of the importance
of individual privacy-dignity and the need to protect that set of interests against
unreasonable government action. The replacement of the human eye, ear, and nose
by more sophisticated technical devices is increasingly seen not merely as a refinement
in the older techniques of surveillance but as a revolutionary step in stripping indi-
viduals of their privacy.42  And since the Court has shown little dismay because of
the charge that their decisions invalidating convictions frequently permit guilty men
to go free, it will hardly think that some decline of law enforcement effectiveness is
too great a price to pay for enhancing the right to privacy. A sharp increase in the
incidence of certain crimes might, however, induce the Court to weigh the interests
with a different result in the future. Nor is it impossible to conceive of judicially
controlled official eavesdropping that might survive attack on fourth amendment
grounds.43
(4) The Supreme Court has upheld administrative searches by health officials
acting under laws that authorized searches of homes and other premises without
warrant. In the first case, Frank v. Maryland,44 there was substantial evidence out-
side the suspected home of possible rat infestation. In Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,"
4o x6 U.S. 616 (1886).
42 277 U.S. at 471 (1928).
42 This is obviously not accepted by those who argue that new techniques represent mere refinements
of established ways of observing others and that if a policeman may legally report what he sees or
hears, the fruits of the new devices should be admissible. But it is because we have reasonably
effective means of protecting ourselves from the unwanted snooping of policemen and others that the
new devices are sought in order to break through the individual's available defenses.
"'Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wiretapping, 03 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1954), con-
dudes that wiretapping, because of its illimitable "search" of conversations, could not meet constitutional
warrant requirements. Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professors View, 44 MINN.
L. ,av. 891 (ig6o), disagrees. His argument is that if wiretapping is not a conventional means of
searching, its limitations should be tested by other than the conventional requirement of a description
of the "things to be seized."
A4 359 U.S. 360 (1959)-
'A 364 U.S. 263 (196o).
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the request to inspect a private house was part of a random process. Here the dash
of interests is more complex than might first appear. It is not simply a question of
public health versus privacy but whether the decision to inspect, at a time of an
inspector's own choosing, is reasonable in the light of a resident's desire to be free
from such inspection or, alternatively, his insistence that a warrant is necessary.
Arguably, a warrant requirement would severely handicap an inspection system, but,
on the other hand, few householders would insist that one be obtained.46 One would
assume that routine inspections might be preceded by at least a general notice of
intention to inspect in certain areas, but in the Ohio case no notice was given. If a
similar case were to arise today, the Court might well invalidate an inspection
system that lacked both warrant and notice provisions, at least when there was a lack
of evidence tending to show a need for inspection without delay. Public opinion may
serve as a significant limiting factor, but the most likely targets of overzealous in-
spectors will be the homes and establishments of those of lower socioeconomic status
and not those of the opinion-leaders of the community.
In the foregoing cases and others the Supreme Court has toiled valiantly, though
with difficulty, to fashion a legal concept protective of privacy from constitutional
provisions and principles. There is every reason to believe that a right to privacy
with constitutional underpinnings will find increasing recognition and application
in the future.47 As an essential facet of human freedom and dignity, a right to
privacy has found a stout champion in a Court devoted to the protection of the
freedom and equality of individuals and groups at a time when they are increasingly
threatened by public and private action. To say that the Court has not yet succeeded
in discovering a formula that can be applied readily to any situation that may arise
is only to recognize a condition of constitutional jurisprudence that is characteristic
whenever important claims or interests clash. What the Court has been doing in a
somewhat tentative way is to insist that privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined
with care and to be denied only when an important countervailing interest is shown
to be superior.
V
NONjUDIcIAI, PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In the preceding sections we have examined the common law and constitutional
foundations of the concept of a right to privacy. But the courts, as we fully recognize,
"Again, it may be doubted whether the conventional warrant requirement is meaningful in this
context. Unless there is external evidence of a health hazard, what can a warrant "describe" when the
inspection is intended to determine whether reasonable health standards are being observed by the
householder? See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, x962 Sup. CT. R-v.
212, 244-46; Comment, State HealAh Inspections and "Unreasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of
Civil Searches, 44 Mum. L. Ray. 5x3 (196o).
47 The quantum of freedom is not a fixed sum, but seems to be capable of expansion to meet the
changing demands and higher standards of society. While the retrogressive possibilities should not be
ignored, the trend in the United States since 1920, though with many halts and some setbacks, has been
toward greater recognition, and protection of the libertarian claims of individuals and groups.
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are limited in their power to shape conduct and to affect the progress of events. Cases
based on the common law or the Constitution arise only when an individual feels
sufficiently aggrieved to become a plaintiff, and large areas of human interaction thus
remain largely free from judicial scrutiny. For the most part, courts can only pro-
nounce judgment that this or that action is wrong; their prescriptive powers are
slight. This suggests that if there are patterns of official and private behavior that
raise privacy issues, reliance solely on the courts is insufficient and that wherever
possible we should look to legislation, administrative action, or private value choices
for 'protection of the right to privacy and dignity' s
A. The Legislative Role
While one would be extremely naive to assume that Congress and the state legis-
latures or local law-making bodies will embark on a sustained campaign to protect
the privacy of Americans from every form of invasion, the legislatures have been
aroused by documented revelations of intrusive activities in both private and govern-
mental life 9 Of course, a show of concern and the massing of evidence through
staff studies and public hearings may not necessarily result in legislation, but at the
very least a useful educational function is served. And in many cases, the admin-
istrative agencies whose activities come under scrutiny will make efforts to reform,
if only to escape the possibility of unwanted controls or other punitive impositions °
Without attempting a complete listing of the areas where legislative concern has
been demonstrated or of those deserving investigation, some of the possible targets
should be noted.
There should be an obvious concern for invasions of privacy arising out of the
potential, or actual, employment relationship. Especially in large-scale enterprises,
management has sought to learn certain vital facts about a prospective employee-Has
he been convicted of crime? Is he honest? Is he a sexual deviate? Does he lead a
"normal" life?-by the use of lie detectors, probing personality tests, and other in-
trusive means.5 ' Once hired, similar techniques may be used to determine an
employee's general conduct and fitness for promotion or to test his asserted innocence
"' The effect on privacy values of the scope of federal governmental operations has been the subject
of recent congressional hearings. See, e.g., Hearings on Invasion of Privacy by Government Agencies
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
ludiciary, 89th Cong., ist Sess. (1965); Hearings on Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcommittee of the
House Government Operations Committee, 89 th Cong., ist Sess. (x965); Hearings on Psychological
Testing Procedures and the Rights of Federal Employees Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., ist Sess. (x965).
"'In many instances, legislatures and administrative agencies will receive their cues from court
decisions, and the most desirable situation would find each legal instrumentality doing its share of the
work, with a division of labor shaped by the capabilities of each.
"The activities of the congressional committees cited in note 48 supra and the fear of stringent
legislation have reputedly helped to induce sudden concern for the dignity and well-being of human
subjects in behavioral research sponsored by the National Institutes of Health and other federal agencies,
See generally Ruebhausen & Brim, supra note 19.
"
1See BRENTON, op. cit. supra note 19, at 6z-ix6; PACKARD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 47-72.
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of theft or embezzlement. 2  Because of widespread use of one or more of these
intrusive techniques, it is useless to suggest that an affected individual need not
accept a position or continue in employment with a firm that uses undesirable
practices. While some labor unions have shown concern, the traditional reluctance
of legislatures to control internal relationshps within the world of industry has, thus
far, led to little legislation.
The reluctance of legislatures to intervene where management practices threaten
privacy-dignity extends to other private spheres, and we should recognize that some
very basic beliefs about the proper role of government and law in a free society lie
behind the refusal of legislatures to act. Nevertheless, if corporate managers, labor
union leaders, university administrators, and other key figures in control of private
organizations adopt practices that threaten important privacy values, legislatures will
eventually feel compelled to act, particularly if one or more interest groups raise the
issue and elicit public support-which is more easily obtained as the public becomes
more fully informed of the frequency and scope of invasionary practices.
It is, of course, possible that many of the laws enacted to combat intrusive behavior
in the private sectors of society will amount to little in practice. One can point to
state laws prohibiting wiretapping that are rarely, if ever, enforcedY3 Ignoring the
obvious difficulties in enforcing wiretapping laws, it can be argued that the mere
existence of such laws is to some extent a deterrent to private wiretapping, either
because of fear of detection and punishment or because of moral inhibitions against
violating a law. But statutes prohibiting or regulating private use of lie detectors, or
narcoanalysis or the more intrusive kinds of personality tests, or restrictions on mis-
leading or intrusive tactics of pollsters and market researchers, would seemingly be
more readily enforced than the laws aimed at wiretapping. And the existence on the
books of laws protecting privacy, coupled with the readiness of legislatures to enact
additional legislation should the need arise, will undoubtedly have a salutary
effect on those in private life who determine the extent to which the lives of others
will be subject to intense scrutiny and other invasionary practices?
The increasing attention given by legislatures to the activities of private investi-
gators and lie detector technicians suggests one fruitful line of attack. The imposition
of higher licensing standards and the requirement of fuller disclosure of their
methods of operation, together with more effective policing of the less scrupulous,
would greatly improve the ethical standards of these groups. It may be that the
development through legislation of licensing and other requirements for the various
classes of operatives whose skills and activities pose threats to privacy is the most
promising technique for achieving reasonable control over their activities.
52BRFNTON, op. cit. supra note 19, at 117-37; PACARD, op. c. supra note 19, at 73-102.
11 See DAsH, KNOWLTON & ScHwARTz, op. cit. supra note ig, at 16z-23o.
" This "educative" and admonitory function of law is frequently underrated. Because the enactment
of a law is not followed by a substantial number of prosecutions, the legislative contribution is not,
therefore, meaningless.
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Whatever the difficulties in trying to eliminate or moderate intrusive behavior
in the private sector, there are fewer reasons for legislative inaction with respect to
the conduct of government officials. In spite of past descriptions of the world of
the government administrator as that of a "headless fourth branch" and criticisms
of the extensive discretionary powers given to certain administrative agencies and
officials, a more realistic appraisal is that administrators are not only extremely
conscious of law and rules but operate in an atmosphere of fear lest they incur the
disfavor of the relevant committee of the legislature.5" Thus, legislative bodies are
strategically placed for insisting that their progeny-the administrative agencies-
observe reasonable standards of behavior.
If the local law-making and appropriating bodies were to interest themselves in
the day-to-day performance of law enforcement agencies that adversely affect privacy,
it is unlikely that illegal or undesirable activities would continue." Similarly, the
ways in which health and fire inspectors, welfare investigators, and other officials
affect the privacy of the objects of their attention can be subjected to legislative
scrutiny.5T Even if no legislation results, the legislative investigation, a device which
has itself been used on occasion for unreasonably intrusive forays but is more con-
sistently employed in the exercise of legislative oversight, can have an important im-
pact on the way in which administrators deal with the public.
Whether legislatures can be induced to maintain a systematic review of admin-
istrative behavior affecting privacy is doubtful. It would be helpful, for example, if
one or more subcommittees maintained a constant surveillance of the information
gathering activities of government. There may be plausible reasons for accumulating
more and more information about each citizen, in order to improve efficiency of tax
collection or to permit planners and administrators in other agencies to carry out their
functions more efficiently, since any government agency operates more rationally
when prqvided with adequate information. But clearly there are data that lie outside
the pale of government concern and other matters that must be treated as con-
fidential and with stringent safeguards of confidentiality." For the most part, the
"See generally JosEPH P. HARus, CoNoas mIoAL CONTROL OF ADMINIMTRATION (1964).
6 For the most part, the quality of police and their observance of decent standards of behavior is
directly related to the over-all efficiency of local governing bodies, which generally in the United States
has been low.
" The new emphasis on equality in fact as well as in law for formerly disadvantaged and mute
groups will surely carry over to this area.
58 Statutes at all levels of government provide for confidentiality of various classes of data, reflecting
the past concern of lawmakers for certain privacy values. See generally Karst, "The Files": Legal
Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, infra, pp. 342-76, especially pp.
347-50, 369-71. It should be noted how carefully the Bureau of the Census guards the confidentiality
of the business and other data under its control. When the Supreme Court held that file copies of
reports furnished by businesses to the Bureau were subject to subpoena by the Federal Trade Commission,
St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (z961), Congress quickly closed this gap in the
protection of confidentiality. 76 Stat. 922 (1962), 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (x964). See Hearings on Confi-
dentiality of Census Reports Before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962).
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information needed for efficient government operation concerns the needs, wishes, or
behavior of human aggregates rather than of specific individuals. Much of the
information could be gathered through contracts with private research organizations
pursuant to which the identity of individuals would be concealed.
In conclusion, it can be argued that legislative bodies, because of their representa-
tive role and their crucial position as intermediaries between the working arms of
government and the people for whose benefit government exists, have a largely un-
used capacity for drawing meaningful boundaries between permissible and un-
desirable forms of governmental action, in the light of their effect on privacy and
dignity. They are unhampered by the limitations of case litigation and possess vastly
greater resources than the courts for identifying and weighing the interests that
oppose and those that support privacy daims. 9
B. Administrative Choices
It would be grossly unfair to those entrusted with important administrative powers
to assume that they are lacking in concern for privacy-dignity values. The vast
majority of administrators are very sensitive to adverse reactions of their constituencies
and the public in general and to any signs of displeasure from the legislature. But
administrators are committed to the achievement of policy goals, and they are
keenly aware of both internal and external pressures to perform their jobs efficiently.
They are confronted by taxpayers seeking economical administration, special consti-
tuents demanding services, adversely affected parties who seek to divert their attention,
and superiors wanting the credit for successful administration at the least cost in
money and political enemies.
Either because of legal requirements or by choice, many government agencies
are avid collectors of data relevant to their assigned functions. The Internal Revenue
Service wants accurate data on financial transactions that affect tax liability. The
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
seek data on business practices that may offend some provision of the antitrust laws.
Local welfare agencies wish to avoid improper payments and cause unannounced
nighttime visits to be made to the homes of recipients to determine if an allegedly
deserting male has, in fact, returned. Law enforcement officials are under constant
pressure to solve crimes, particularly those that are notorious, where there may be
little evidence available through normal forms of surveillance. Any agency faced
with a problem of employee turnover, or plagued by internal thefts, or whose work
may be endangered by emotionally disturbed or morally deficient employees, will
seek to avoid appointment of misfits or will seek to weed out those with dangerous
habits or mental or moral deficiencies. Particularly where national security interests
'* The chief disadvantage is the difficulty of evolving legislative standards that can be fittted to con-
duct that takes diverse and changing forms. And one danger that must be faced is that the enactment of
legislation (or refusal to do so) may be interpreted by the courts as a restriction on judge-made law. See
Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 9a5 (r956).
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are immediately involved, it is hardly to be expected that the dignity of the employee
will loom large when the interests are balanced.
It would be fruitless and irrational to insist that privacy values should consistently
receive preference over governmental action that threatens those values. If govern-
ment, and only government, can perform many essential social functions, it is in-
evitable that individual citizens must yield to some extent their claim "to be let
alone." What can be asked of the administrator, however, is his observance of certain
safeguards: namely, that he examine the objectives to be obtained by the intrusive
action, determine that these are indeed important, and assure himself (a) that the
means selected are necessary and appropriate; (b) that there is no equally suitable
means of attaining the objective that avoids an adverse effect on privacy values; (c)
that where the confidentiality of data is required by law, adequate safeguards will
be observed to maintain confidentiality in fact; and (d) that the agency provides
some form of internal review of decisions that involve privacy issues.
Neither these nor any other set of prescribed procedures or considerations will
eliminate or solve all the questions that may arise. But these or similar standards
for administrative behavior can reduce needless invasions of privacy by sensitizing
officials to some of the undesirable potentialities of their acts and by establishing insti-
tutional responsibility for the behavior of individual representatives. A special agency
committee might be given special responsibility to review all proposed programs or
specific actions that raise serious privacy-dignity issues. What must be recognized is
the inevitability of differing views as to the correct balancing of issues, so that
reasonable men may reach opposite conclusions as to whether an allegedly in-
vasionary act is "reasonable." Application of a standard of "reasonableness" requires
a calculation in which each element in the formula must be weighted according to
the value system of the assayer. But this is hardly a novelty in the law, and what
must be stressed is the extent to which shared values are so largely evident in most
situations requiring judgment. Nor is it likely that the administration of important
public programs will suffer because of a new concern for privacy-dignity values.
It is hardly clear that use of a prying personality test is essential to good personnel
policies, or that government cannot maintain its secrets without the use of lie
detector tests on employees, or that a welfare program will be seriously harmed if
investigators forgo midnight visitations.
One positive result of administrative initiative in avoiding unreasonable intrusive
practices is that the need for, and likelihood of, legislative intervention are diminished.
And in spite of what has been stated above concerning the possible role of the legis-
lature, it must be recognized that statutory treatment may be an extremely rough and
insensitive way of dealing with the subtle conflicts of interests in this area. In attempt-
" Obviously, if the decisions to use intrusive methods are not subject to effective review by the
agency, we can expect zealous officials to choose in favor of achieving policy goals. The common
criticism of officials at all levels is that they lack a consuming interest to achieve policy goals.
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ing to deal with a flagrant and unique misuse of governmental power, the balance
may be shifted too drastically in favor of privacy-dignity. For example, banning of
all personality tests might cut off a potentially valuable tool in selecting employees
for certain positions. Welfare investigators may, at times, be justified in making
home visits at an unusual hour. A security investigation of those in sensitive posi-
tions seems patently reasonable. The administrator, then, is the most strategically
placed official in the political system for determining how government can accomplish
its goals without unreasonable threats to the privacy and freedom of the public.
C. The Private Sector
What has been said of the role of the government administrator applies, with
modifications, to those who hold executive and administrative positions in the various
organizations and associations that affect our daily lives more immediately and
in many cases more substantially than do governmental agencies. In the myriad
decisions, procedures, relationships, and activities that make up the world of business,
labor organizations, universities, and other private entities, the living law of society
is constantly being applied, refined, reshaped to meet the felt needs of the society,
To the extent that those possessing the power of decision in these private worlds
choose to incorporate a concern for privacy-dignity values in the "due process" rules
and standards that they announce and enforce, the demand and need for the formal
legal system to respond will be minimized. For, at heart, the values that find ex-
pression in legal decisions, statutes, or administrative rules and orders must reflect the
consensus of the leaders of opinion and action in the wider society. While judges,
lawmakers, and administrators have a capacity for helping to teach us to select the
more desirable of competing values, they in turn are instructed and informed by the
acts and beliefs of those who shape the society of which they are a part. The pro-
tection of privacy-dignity values, then, is not solely a task for the law but part of
a never-ending quest to increase the respect of all men for the essential values of
human life.
